Abstract Wallach and Allen's seminal book, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, categorized theories of machine ethics by the types of algorithms each employs (e.g. top-down vs. bottom-up), ultimately concluding that a hybrid approach would be necessary (2008). Humans are hybrids individuallyour brains are wired to adapt our evaluative approach to our circumstances. For example, stressors can inhibit the action of oxytocin in the brain, thus forcing a nurse who usually acts from subjective empathy to defer to objective rules instead (Zak, 2011) . In contrast, ecosystem approaches to ethics promote hybridization across, rather than within, individuals; the nurse being empowered to specialize in personalized care because other workers specialize in standardization, and profitability, etc. Various philosophers have argued, or laid the framework to argue, that such specialization can be advantageous to teams and societies (e
Current Studies of Evaluative Diversity
Let me start by clarifying what I mean by moral diversity vs. evaluative diversity. In the decade since I wrote "Ethics for Artificial Intelligences" (2002) , which I thought was proposing the field of machine ethics, I developed mixed feelings about choosing terms as sensationalistic as "ethics" and "morality." These terms have special political utility. For example, when Elliot Turiel argues that a decision to drive on the right-hand side of the road is conventional and therefore less moral than a decision about whether to feed a hungry stranger (Turiel, 1983) , I believe he is engaging in a political struggle to privilege people who have less-conventional proclivities (i.e. liberals). Likewise, when my former academic advisor, Elliott Sober, argues that the decision not to prick oneself with a pin is less moral because it flows from one's proclivities and therefore requires no moral conventions (Sober and Wilson, 2000) ; I believe he is engaging in that same struggle from the opposite side. These arguments require definitions of "morality" by which it is possible to be immoral or non-moral. My growing appreciation for such philosophers makes me regret hijacking their terms.
I will use the term "evaluative diversity" instead of "moral diversity" to allow the possibility that morality might go beyond evaluation in some way that makes the debate of Turiel and Sober relevant. In contrast to morality, all decisionmaking involves evaluation, so all decision-making machines are evaluative. We may have difficulty convincing most people that the Geiger counter in the Schrodinger's Cat thought experiment qualifies as a moral agent, but some part of it clearly makes an independent evaluation which determines the fate of the cat. Not understanding the technical distinction between evaluative diversity and moral diversity, I have always used the two terms interchangeably, but I will try to reserve the latter term for philosophers who may want it to refer to diversity among rule sets, or among virtues, or among goals, not entertaining the possibility of morality without rules, without virtues, without goals, or, as in the case of Schrodinger's cat, without any of the three.
Current studies of evaluative diversity focus on measurement. It may be popular to theorize that hospitals need both objective calculation and subjective compassion, both a logical-side and a mystical-side, both tradition and innovation, but it is no theoretical matter to determine precisely what kinds of evaluative diversity exist in healthcare, and which, if any, yield lasting advantage. In biological ecosystems, for comparison, most species remain unidentified, we have difficulty determining which are obsolete, and debate remains open about how to replace the concept of species with a more precise conceptualization of the functioning units of a biological ecosystem (e.g. Quere, et al., 2005; Lewontin, 1970) .
Before offering a sample ecosystem approach for developing ethical medical machines, this chapter will start by acknowledging the wide range of efforts underway to refine our understanding of the roles evaluative diversity already plays in human teams, families, and societies. A sample of the behavioral measures, interview techniques, survey instruments, neurological measures, genetic measures, and social impact measures developed thus far will clarify what evaluative diversity is and will establish the interdisciplinary nature of our topic.
Behavioral measures
The Milgram experiment and Public Goods Game are examples of behavioral measures of evaluative diversity. Like studies of computer security, moral traps such as the Milgram experiment divide subjects by their vulnerability to manipula-tion (Milgram, 1963) . Many repetitions have revealed that 34-39% of humans take evaluative approaches which are not vulnerable to this trap. Such people, despite being in the minority, may serve to protect society as a whole from malicious social engineering.
The Public Goods Game divides subjects into three categories based on the strategies they exhibit in a model social situation: "free-riders," "enforcers," and "others" (Barreto and Ellmers, 2002; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Sosis and Ruffle, 2003; Yamagishi, 2003) . Free riders consistently choose not to contribute to public investment, while enforcers consistently make personal sacrifices to punish free riding. The profit for each player drops when the rules of the game prohibit enforcers from exhibiting their diversity. This particular game does not similarly demonstrate the social value of free riders, though it may be obvious that humanity would not dominate Earth (as we do), if our species did not include members who free ride on other species.
Interview/Survey Techniques
Studies of human personality have converged upon five major dimensions: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Norman, 1963) . At least two of these five, openness and agreeableness, represent differences in the way people evaluate options. Openness contrasts the tendency to evaluate on the basis of norms vs. the tendency to pursue novelty. Agreeableness contrasts the tendency to include others in ones evaluative process (i.e. trust) vs. the tendency to compete (or at least to maintain social boundaries). A great deal of survey research investigated these evaluative differences among humans before it was clear that the same differences would appear among potential designs for medical machines-it may be a rich source of untapped insight.
The scientific study of moral diversity is often traced to Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of stages of moral development. Kohlberg developed a process called the Moral Judgment Interview which could consistently categorize subjects based on the reasons behind their answers to standard moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1981) . This technique was later refined into a survey instrument called the Defining Issues Test which established the existence of at least four different types (Rest, 1979) . It also inspired the development of the Moral Judgment Test which, much like the Milgram experiment, categorizes subjects based upon the predictability of their reasoning (Lind, 1978) .
Recognizing that evaluation does not necessarily involve conscious reasoning, other psychologists developed more generic interview/survey procedures to divide subjects into moral categories (Walker, Frimer and Dunlop, 2010; Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009; Steare, 2006) . In contrast to reasons-based research, which served to justify privileging one type of person over others, newer research shows that moral exemplars exist of diverse types, and that privileging one type over others would entail privileging a political group (i.e. conservative or liberal).
Physiological Measures
Some scientists have used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to identify correlations between structural differences in the brain and differences in evaluative approach, including conservative vs. liberal approach and emotional vs. cognitive approach (Kanai, Feilden, Firth and Rees, 2011; Greene, 2009) . Similar ties to physiology are obtained through twin studies, such as the finding that 43% of variance in agreement with conservative attitudes can be attributed to genetic factors (Alford, Funk and Hibbing, 2005) .
Other scientists have identified neurotransmitters and hormones which facilitate different evaluative approaches, such as the roles oxytocin and dopamine play in empathy and reward seeking. (Zak, 2010; Arias-Carrión and Pöppel, 2007) . Concentrations of such chemicals can vary from person to person, but also respond to external stimuli, causing individuals to shift approach (Cushman, Young and Hauser, 2006; Kram, Kramer, Ronan, Steciuk and Petty, 2002; Isen and Levin, 1972) . Physiological studies are important not only to demonstrate that the moral freedom of machines is not so different from that of humans, but also to permit reliable measurement when subjects might misrepresent themselves (e.g. studying evaluative diversity in prison populations).
Social impact measures
Much as suppressing the function of plants could shift the concentration of carbon dioxide in our atmosphere, suppressing a type of evaluation could shift teamlevel variables. For example, engineering teams' abilities to win design competitions has been shown to drop threefold if diversity of personality is not maintained (Wilde, 2010) . Since a substantial portion of personality differences are evalua-tive, this suggests that evaluatively diverse teams of machines might likewise be better able to compete in situations which require innovation.
Research into organizational culture (sometimes called "national culture") points to a range of team-level variables which likely rely on the inclusion of certain forms of evaluation. Such variables include uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs. collectivism, long-versus short-term orientation, innovation, stability, respect for people, outcome orientation, attention to detail, team orientation, and consistency (Hofstede, 2001; O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell, 1991; Denison, 1990) .
There is much research yet to be done in all of these areas, behavioral, psychological, physiological, and social; however, the current state of research has at least established the existence of evaluative diversity among humans. It challenges machine ethicists to consider whether such diversity should be maintained as we delegate more and more evaluation to machines. Economies of scale favor massproduction of a single design, but that would entail a dramatic departure from preindustrial decision-making in which individual decision-makers (i.e. humans) were so evaluatively diverse.
GRIN: A Sample Ecosystem Model
Shifting our discussion to machines, let's consider a sample evaluative ecosystem model I call GRIN (Gadfly, Relational, Institutional, Negotiator) . This is a simplistic model akin to biological ecosystem models which use broad classifications like "plant", "grazer", "predator" and "parasite." Simplistic models are a good place to start, and efforts to preserve diversity at rough levels often preserve diversity at other levels as well. GRIN aligns with the human evaluative diversity research discussed above, but is defined in terms of algorithms, so it is readily applied to software engineering.
Wallach, Allen and Smit (2005) split the entire class of possible algorithms into those for which output is expected to be unpredictable to the programmer (called bottom-up) vs. those for which output would be relied upon (called top-down). further divided the top-down category into consequentialist vs. deontological. GRIN augments this classification by likewise dividing the bottom-up category based on source of unpredictability. Additionally, it renames the categories to avoid the implication that all consequentialist and deontological theories of ethics can be implemented on machines. This yields the following four categories of evaluation:
Gadfly Evaluation: Evaluation whose output is expected to be unpredictable because it employs randomness generation. We can exemplify this category with a mutator from evolutionary computation (e.g. De Jong, 2006; Thompson, 1996) . It periodically mutates randomly.
Relational Evaluation: Evaluation whose output is expected to be unpredictable because of sensitivity to position in a network (e.g. Schiff, 2011; Yang, 2009) . We can exemplify this category with a class-three or class-four cellular automaton. Network effects allow randomness in initial conditions to keep class-three andfour cellular automata unpredictable without any additional randomness generation.
Institutional Evaluation: Evaluation whose output would be relied upon to uphold objective rules (e.g. Giarratano and Riley, 2005) . We can exemplify this category with a standard calculator. It is relied upon to apply the rules of arithmetic consistently regardless of network position, never unlearning nor experimenting.
Negotiator Evaluation: Evaluation whose output would be relied upon to maximize some measurable variable by learning (e.g. Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil, 2006) . We can exemplify this category with supervised learning for stock trading; it is relied upon to maximize profit.
Note that a proficient stock trading machine would typically contain at least one calculator and many mutators; thus, evaluators can qualify for different categories than their subcomponents do. Much as individual decision-makers cannot make all possible choices, individual evaluators cannot be of all four types-each has the type of its highest structural level, the level which ultimately controls its behavior. Effective evaluative diversity therefore requires an ecosystem in which no one type of individual completely rules the others (i.e. there must be a meaningful potential for conflict between machines).
The smallest subcomponents of a machine are always relational (i.e. at the chemical level), but an ideal ecosystem might also include relational evaluation even at the highest levels (e.g. machines which treat certain users better than others, as in personalized interfaces). At the level of the user interface, most modern medical machines are institutional, perhaps because they are purchased by executives and managers who want obedience. Thus, current ethical concerns about medical machines are often actually concerns merely about institutional evaluation (e.g. lack of empathy, difficulty unlearning mistakes, etc.) However, academic computer scientists have all four kinds of machines in the pipeline. Negotiators produce the greatest measureable results (Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil, 2006) . Systems which include gadflies produce the greatest innovation (De Jong, 2006) . Relational subcomponents can add efficiency (Yang, 2009) , and relational networks can have emergent (spiritual) properties (Schiff, 2011) . The proven ad-vantages of each type hint at why we might want to include all four kinds of machines, as well as all four kinds of people, in healthcare. The next section of this chapter discusses how to justify such an approach.
Justifying Evaluative Diversity
In the 20th century, the United States enacted policies aimed to protect forests by completely suppressing wildfires. Previously, wildfires burned about 10% of California forests each year, destroying all but the tallest trees. Because young growth is short, forests before the 20th century had few medium-sized trees. By increasing the relative population of medium-sized trees, fire suppression created a new kind of forest. When the new forests accidentally did catch fire, they burned differently, destroying even the tallest trees, and taking much longer to recover (Stephens, Martin and Clinton, 2007; Stephens and Ruth, 2005) . Thus, attempts to protect diversity backfired, ironically diminishing resilience. This track record does not completely discredit efforts to justify diversity management, but it does raise important caution.
Typical justifications for moral or evaluative diversity point to some measurable variable (e.g. survival rate) which would decrease on average under conditions of uncertainty if diversity were lost. More diverse systems are robust against a wider class of attacks, can access a wider set of innovations, have less system-level variation, and can enjoy the economic benefits of specialization and competition (Dean, 2012; Page, 2011; Kitcher, 1990; Maynard Smith, 1982; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson, Near & Miller, 1996) . Such mathematical-model justifications all assume a negotiator approach; they imply a way to calculate an optimal diversity mix, exactly the kind of calculation which justified wildfire suppression. Having learned their lesson, modern forest managers engage in adaptive management in which notions of optimality are periodically re-examined-they do not expect to reduce ecosystems to mathematical models.
Although the negotiator perspective is customary in modern boardrooms, it may be overridden in other contexts by appeals to such concerns as scripture, compassion, and freedom. For example, such factors may influence decisions about how long to maintain life-support for a patient in a coma. In contrast to mathematicalmodel approaches, the following justification for the GRIN model is a set of arguments showing the independent inadequacy of each GRIN type from within its own perspective. Mathematical arguments can be valid and valuable, but, unless supplemented by the arguments below, they might bias us toward rule by negotiators, thus destroying the very diversity they aim to protect.
All of the following six arguments have been well-known across diverse cultures for millennia; anyone attempting to build a moral medical machine would do well to consider them, whether taking an ecosystem approach or not:
Against Individual Evaluation
The argument that proper evaluation must stem from a perspective greater than one's own (e.g. from God or evolution) tells against negotiator and relational approaches. Against negotiators, it is pointed out that individual evaluators lack ability to predict or control essential consequences (an ability assumed by negotiator evaluation). This problem for negotiators is articulated mathematically in Pascal's Wager (Pascal and Havet, 1852) , for example, and finds empirical justification in evidence for Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg, 1927) and the Butterfly Effect (Lorenz, 1963) . The resulting inadequacy of negotiator evaluation (and justification for a more diverse approach) has more recently been dubbed "Black Swan Theory" (Taleb, 2010) . Against the relationally oriented, it is pointed out that individual attempts to practice relational virtues, such as compassion, backfire (e.g. become cronyism). For example, in experiments conducted by Paul Slovic (2007) , the application of empathy to public health decision-making degraded average health outcomes.
The social importance of these arguments is strongly implied by their emergence across diverse world religions and philosophies:
You will say to yourself, "My strength and the might of my hand has accumulated this wealth for me." But you must remember the Lord your God, for it is He that gives you strength to make wealth. Devarim 8:17-18 There is no righteous man on earth who does good and sins not. Kohelet 7:20 Hard man's heart is to restrain, and wavering. Bhagavad Gita 6.35 He who discards scriptural injunctions and acts according to his own whims attains neither perfection, nor happiness, nor the supreme destination. Bhagavad Gita 16.23 Where the greatest virtue resides, only the teachings may reveal. Laozi 21 It is futile trying to possess the universe, and act on shaping it in the direction of one's ambition. The instruments of the universe cannot be shaped. Act upon it and you will fail, grasp onto it and it will slip. Laozi 29 "These sons belong to me, and this wealth belongs to me," with such thoughts a fool is tormented. He himself does not belong to himself; how much less sons and wealth? Dhammapada 62 As a cowherd with his staff drives his cows into the stable, so do Age and Death drive the life of men.
Dhammapada 135
There is no such thing as perfect enlightenment to obtain. If a perfectly enlightened buddha were to say to himself, 'I am enlightened' he would be admitting there is an individual person, a separate self and personality, and would therefore not be a perfectly enlightened buddha. Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra, Ch. 9 The Master said, "If you are respectful but lack ritual you will become exasperating; if you are careful but lack ritual you will become timid; if you are courageous but lack ritual you will become unruly; and if you are upright but lack ritual you will become inflexible." Lun Yu 8:2 Life and death are governed by fate, wealth and honor are determined by Heaven. Lun Yu 12:5 He told them a story to illustrate the point. "There was a rich man whose land was very productive," he began. "The man thought to himself, 'what shall I do, because I've nowhere to store my produce?' He decided, 'this is what I'll do-I'll pull down my barns and build bigger ones, and I'll be able to store all my produce and possessions. Then I'll tell myself, 'Self, you have enough for many years, so take it easy, eat, drink, and have fun!' But God told him, 'Foolish man! Tonight your life is required to be returned-and who will get everything you've stored up?'" Luke 12:16-21 Inwardly I love God's law, but I see a different law at work in my body, fighting against the principles I have decided on in my mind and defeating me, so I become a prisoner of the law of sin inside me. What a hopeless man I am! Who will rescue me from this dead body of mine? Romans 7:22-24 Man was created Weak in flesh. Quran 4:28 Man is given to hasty deeds. Quran 17:11 "If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants" Isaac Newton (1959) These passages merit interpretation, but it is plausible that each offers a similar instruction about the pitfalls of negotiator and/or relational evaluation, an instruction now supported by scientific evidence that the flaws of individualism justify deference to communal evaluative processes (e.g. objective rules).
Against Reason
The argument that our reasoning faculties cannot be perfected tells against negotiator and institutional approaches, both of which rely crucially on reasoning. In what is recognized as one of the all-time greatest achievements of reasoning, Gö-del's Incompleteness Theorem proves that formal reasoning will never be able to discern all truth (Charlesworth, 1980) . Other varieties of the argument highlight problems of language (e.g. words mean different things to different people) or our inability to recognize errors in our reasoning (Pizarro, et al., 2006; Wittgenstein, 1958) .
For people unprepared to fully appreciate these highly technical works and their application to machine ethics, the emergence of less rigorous versions of the same arguments across diverse world religions and philosophies may suffice to raise caution about reason-based machines and their imperfect creators:
With their lips they honor Me, but their heart they draw far away from Me, and their fear of Me has become a command of people, which has been taught. Therefore, I will continue to perform obscurity to this people, obscurity upon obscurity, and the wisdom of his wise men shall be lost, and the understanding of his geniuses shall be hidden. Yeshayahu 29:13-14 "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways My ways," says the Lord. "As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are My ways higher than your ways and My thoughts [higher] than your thoughts. Yeshayahu 55:7-9 Foolish ones, even though they strive, discern not, having hearts unkindled, ill-informed! Bhagavad Gita 15.1 The Dao cannot be named by common rules. Laozi 14 The timeless masters of the Teachings is not about enlightening the people with it, but about humbling the people with it. Laozi 65 All that has a form is illusive and unreal. Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra, Ch. 5 As to speaking truth, no truth can be spoken. Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra, Ch. 21 The Master said, "If you try to guide the common people with regulations...[they] will become evasive and will have no sense of shame..." Lun Yu 2:3 The Master said, "I should just give up! I have yet to meet someone who is able to perceive his own faults and then take himself to task inwardly." Lun Yu 5:27 Jesus replied "...whoever doesn't have [understanding] , whatever they have will be taken away from them. That's why I speak to them in illustrations, because seeing, they do not see; and hearing, they do not hear, nor do they understand. To them the prophecy of Isaiah is fulfilled: 'Even though you hear, you won't comprehend, and even though you see, you won't understand'. They have a hard-hearted attitude, they don't want to listen, and they've closed their eyes." As to those who reject Faith, it is the same to them whether thou warn them or do not warn them; they will not believe. God hath set a seal on their hearts and on their hearing, and on their eyes is a veil. Quran 2:6-7 Of a surety, they are the ones who make mischief, but they realize it not. Quran 2:12
As with the first argument, these passages merit interpretation, but it is plausible that each offers a similar instruction about the pitfalls of negotiator and institutional evaluation, an instruction now supported by scientific evidence and mathematical proof that our reasoning faculties alone are unreliable guides for behavior.
Social Innovation
The argument that reformers (a.k.a. "prophets") can improve upon inherited norms (either because perfect norms have yet to be introduced or because norms have degraded) tells against relational and institutional approaches, both of which involve taking some inherited norms on faith. History reveals that norms have changed (Pinker, 2011) , and numerous studies have established that reform typically has positive economic impact (e.g. Fan, 2011; Steil et al. 2002) . The value of reform has been cited in diverse world religions and philosophies for millennia, and such broad citation hints at the inadequacy of machines incapable of innovating social reform:
I will set up a prophet for them from among their brothers like you, and I will put My words into his mouth, and he will speak to them all that I command him. Devarim 18:18 And it shall come to pass afterwards that I will pour out My spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and daughters shall prophesy; your elders shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions. And even upon the slaves and the maidservants in those days will I pour out My spirit. Yoel 3:1-2 So let the enlightened toil...set to bring the world deliverance. Bhagavad Gita 3.25 The purity of Yog is to pass beyond the recorded traditions...such as one ranks above ascetics, higher than the wise, beyond achievers of vast deeds! Bhagavad Gita 6.44-46 When the Dao is lost, so there arises benevolence and righteousness. Laozi 18 A Buddha is not easily found, he is not born everywhere. Wherever such a sage is born, that race prospers. Dhammapada 193 Three leaders have already lived: Kakusandha, Konagamana, and also Buddha Kassapa. The Buddha Supreme, now am I, but after me Mettayya comes. Buddhavamsa 27:18-19 There is much more to tell you, but you couldn't bear it yet. But when the Spirit of truth comes, he will lead you to understand the truth. John 16:12-13 And he gave some [to be] apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, unto the work of ministering, unto the building up of the body of Christ: till we all attain unto the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a full grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ: that we may be no longer children, tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine… Ephesians 4:11-14 For each period is a Book revealed. Quran 13:38 The Holy Prophet [s] said: "He whose two days of life are the same, making no spiritual progress, is at loss." vol. 71, p. 173 It is plausible that each of these passages highlights a problem with relational and institutional evaluation, a problem now confirmed by the scientific and historical evidence that inherited norms are subject to improvement by reformers.
Against Measurement
The negotiator approach is specifically challenged by the argument that measurable pursuits backfire by escalating competition and desire (a.k.a. hedonic adaptation). Both purported problems have been confirmed empirically among humans (Wilson and Wilson, 2008; Diener and Fujita, 2005; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Lykken and Tellegen, 1996) . There is no reason to expect negotiator machines to have any less difficulty-in fact, the theme has become a cliché of science-fiction (e.g. in the movie, War Games, "The only winning move is not to play."). The argument has been beautifully articulated in diverse world religions and philosophies for millennia:
The eyes of man will not be sated. Mishlei 27:20 Whoever loves silver will not be sated with silver, and he who loves a multitude without increase-this too is vanity. Kohelet 5:9
If one ponders on objects of the sense, there springs attraction; from attraction grows desire, desire flames to fierce passion, passion breeds recklessness; then the memory -all betrayed -lets noble purpose go, and saps the mind, till purpose, mind and man are all undone. Bhagavad Gita 2.62-63 Surrendered to desires insatiable, full of deceitfulness, folly, and pride, in blindness cleaving to their errors, caught into the sinful course, they trust this lie as it were true -this lie which leads to death: Finding in Pleasure all the good which is, and crying "Here it finishes!" Bhagavad Gita 16.11
If everybody knows what beauty is, then beauty is not beauty anymore; if everybody knows what goodness is, then goodness is not goodness anymore. Laozi 2 Not to quest for wealth will keep the people from rivalry. Laozi 3 Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy. He who has given up both victory and defeat, he, the contented, is happy. Dhammapada 201 If a man is tossed about by doubts, full of strong passions, and yearning only for what is delightful, his thirst will grow more and more, and he will indeed make his fetters strong. Dhammapada 349 Ji Kangzi was concerned about the prevalence of robbers in Lu and asked Confucius about how to deal with this problem. Confucius said, "If you could just get rid of your own excessive desires, the people would not steal even if you rewarded them for it." Lun Yu 12:18 If your Majesty say, "What is to be done to profit my kingdom?" the great officers will say, "What is to be done to profit our families?" and the inferior officers and the common people will say, "What is to be done to profit our persons?" Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and the kingdom will be endangered. Mengzi 1A:1 "You evil servant! I forgave you all your debt because you asked me to. Shouldn't you have had mercy on your fellow servant too, just as I had for you?" His lord became angry and handed him over to the prison guards until he repaid all the debt. Matthew 18:32-34 But they that are minded to be rich fall into a temptation and a snare and many foolish and hurtful lusts, such as drown men in destruction and perdition. 1 Timothy 6:9 Those saved from the covetousness of their own souls, they are the ones that achieve prosperity. Quran 59:9 The seventh Imam, Musa ibn Ja'far [a], said: "The likeness of this world is as the water of the sea. However much (water) a thirsty person drinks from it, his thirst increases so much so that the water kills him. vol. 78, p. 311 Although subject to interpretation, it is plausible that each of these passages offers a similar instruction about the pitfalls of negotiator evaluation, an instruction now supported by scientific evidence that efforts at optimization backfire by escalating desire and competition.
Rules Against Rule-Following
The institutional approach is challenged by the fact that some time-tested rules mandate engagement in subjective, emotional, or inconsistent pursuits, and thus cannot be obeyed in an objective fashion. For example, science includes a mandate for exploration (Dunbar and Fugelsang, 2005; Kulkarni and Simon, 1988 When the Buddha explains these things using such concepts and ideas, people should remember the unreality of all such concepts and ideas. They should recall that in teaching spiritual truths the Buddha always uses these concepts and ideas in the way that a raft is used to cross a river. Once the river has been crossed over, the raft is of no more use, and should be discarded. Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra, Chapter 6 These instructions are subject to interpretation, but it is plausible that each creates a paradox for institutional evaluation by mandating some empathic or otherwise subjective pursuit. Thus, despite their diversity, all of these rules can have similar impact in practice-forcing the rule-follower to go "beyond" mere rule-following.
Imitating Non-imitators
The relational approach is challenged by the fact that role-models at the center of relational networks do not imitate other role-models. Thus, relational evaluation ultimately leads to gadfly evaluation. Gadfly role-models seem to be a common theme of time-tested world religions and philosophies:
Jesus broke class barriers, healing lepers and befriending both the rich and the outcast. Each of the six arguments above by itself may be wielded as criticism against particular forms of evaluation; however, taken together, the entire set entails the inadequacy of all individual GRIN types (the dependency of gadflies on others being obvious), leaving us with an ecosystem approach. Much as the independent viability of humanity could undermine justification for environmental protection, the identification of a viable form of evaluation beyond GRIN could undermine this set-wise justification. On the other hand, it might also inspire philosophers to repair the justification by augmenting the set with additional arguments. This is the nature of the project I believe ethicists face: to identify additional forms of evaluation and to identify the weaknesses of those forms from within those forms themselves.
GRIN in Application
This chapter concludes by considering three examples of ecosystem approaches to medical technology: the Global Cardiovascular Risk (GCVR) score, prediction markets, and open data.
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) is a standard developed by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) which blatantly discriminates against non-institutional forms of evaluation. It requires the practice of evidence-based medicine, forcing doctors to apply standardized rules to treatment decisions. Negotiator machines which calculate personalized treatment plans have recently been shown to produce better health outcomes than those of rigorous evidence-based medicine, but HEDIS prohibits the adoption of these innovations (Eddy, et al., 2011) . By developing GCVR as an allowed alternative to HEDIS CVD, the NCQA is making personalized medicine possible, shifting policy towards supporting an ecosystem with diverse approaches (Versel, 2013) .
As a second application of the ecosystem approach in medical technology, prediction markets have shown some success at forecasting infectious diseases and may likewise be applied to estimate the success of potential treatments (Polgreen, et al. 2007) . Prediction markets accommodate all of the GRIN arguments above. Allowing communities to leverage knowledge which cannot be communicated through reason, they converge across iterations of trading, relying on creative individuals to invent new markets and alternative bets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) .
The design of prediction markets can balance the GRIN types. Some leading prediction markets avoid the dominance of negotiator evaluation by using play money or by capping winnings (Servan-Schreiber, et al. 2004 ). They limit institutional evaluation with pricing rules which leave speculators with no winning strategy other than to learn and explore (Hanson, 2007) . Perhaps most importantly, because machines can trade in prediction markets alongside humans, this technology allows machines to participate seamlessly in a human ecosystem, rather than needing to build an ecosystem of their own (Berea and Twardy, 2013) .
A third application, open-knowledge projects like Wikipedia and Linux/Android similarly allow machines to participate seamlessly in a human evaluative ecosystem, performing tasks that would otherwise be performed by human collaborators (Sauper, 2008) . Such projects evolve communally, utilizing many "eyeballs" to correct errors in reasoning (Raymond, 2000) . They limit negotiator and institutional approaches by forfeiting individual property rights and requiring original work (Creative Commons, 2007; Free Software Foundation, Inc., 2008) . They limit relational orientation by raising innovators as role-models (Raymond, 2000) . The rise of personalized medicine requires access to vast databases, from "PatientsLikeMe" to "PatientsLikeMine," and building those databases in an open fashion, where both humans and machines can contribute both data and analysis, could be the ultimate ecosystem approach.
These three applications demonstrate the possibility of promoting evaluative diversity from the institutional level, much as institutions can promote and protect biological diversity. Perhaps the more fascinating commonality shared by all three applications, however, is the fact that each aims to correct an imbalance in human ecosystems. Each technology is motivated by a sense that medicine and other institutions have been growing impersonal, short-sighted, discriminatory, and unable to innovate-in other words, that human evaluative ecosystems are in crisis. Machine ethicists often ask whether machines need humans to make them moral; technological solutions to the ecosystem crisis flip that question to ask whether humans can stay moral without the help of machines.
We have discussed research from a wide range of disciplines examining the diverse ways humans evaluate; we have recognized similar diversity among potential machine designs; we have investigated the ways these different approaches have been criticized across cultures for millennia; and we have considered three applications which accommodate those criticisms. Biological ecosystems are difficult to manage because they are never fully understood-in that sense, ecosystem are spiritual-and we might expect similar difficulty managing an ecosystem approach to medical machine ethics. I have tried to show that positive steps have been made nonetheless, and that the challenge to design software as an ecosystem is just the latest (and perhaps most productive!) manifestation of an ethics challenge we have been facing all along.
